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Abstract This paper investigates political pressure from incumbent Presidents and
Congress on US monetary policy during the period that Greenspan was the chairman
of the Federal Reserve. We propose an expectations-augmented Taylor rule in which
we replace realized values with expectations, and use the unemployment gap instead
of the output gap. We apply a state-space framework that allows the use of mixed
frequency data. Our findings suggest that the Federal Reserve under Greenspan did
not create election driven cycles, but also did not strictly follow the Taylor rule. The
deviations from the Taylor rule are not driven by partisan politics, but are rooted in
the expected economic conditions.
Keywords Taylor rule · Central bank independence · Political business cycles · State
space
JEL Classification E42 · E47 · E58
1 Introduction
Since the breakdown of theBrettonWoods system, a trend towardsmore independence
of central banks is observed.Also the success of the independent Bundesbank led to the
belief that independence of the central bank is a useful device tomaintain price stability.
Furthermore, theMaastricht Treaty requires that having an independent central bank is
a condition for entering the Economic and Monetary Union. Also for former socialist
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countries, an independent central bank is a good start for a well-functioning market
economy. However, policy makers and politicians could have other objectives. This
will be discussed in detail in Sect. 2.
In this paper, we focus on the period August 1987 until and including January
2006 in which the Federal Reserve (Fed) was chaired by Greenspan. This period
is chosen because Taylor (1993) argues that monetary policy accurately describes
monetary policy since 1987, and because in the period after 2006 monetary policy is
strongly affected by the Global Financial Crisis. Some authors argue that Greenspan,
and also other central bankers, departed from a strict or rules-based monetary policy
rule because of favourable or less favourable economic circumstances (see Friedman
2006). Other authors are more critical. Taylor (2009) argues that Greenspan kept rates
too low for too long leading to the housing bubble. In the same vain, Cargill and
O’Driscoll (2012) argue that interest rates lower than predicted by the Taylor rule
contributed to the run-up of real estate prices, the burst of the US bubble economy,
and the subsequent international financial crisis in late 2008 and early 2009. Alsomore
recently, central banks are subject to political pressure, because to resolve the global
financial crisis pressure increased on central banks to shift to an activist policy to
support fiscal imbalances and prop up troubled financial institutions. In an economic
symposium to honour Alan Greenspan’s service, conference participants disagreed
about the extent to which monetary policy in the Greenspan era could be characterized
by a simple rule (Kahn 2005). This paper contributes to this discussion.
This paper investigates whether political pressure from the Presidency and the
Congress has had an effect on monetary policy in the USA in the period August 1987
until and including January 2006. Cargill and O’Driscoll (2013) conclude that Fed’s
emphasis on the short run inevitably subjects them to political pressure. We contribute
to the literature by developing an expectations-augmented Taylor rule and test the
two main theoretical findings of political influence on macroeconomic policy that
originated with Nordhaus (1975) and Hibbs (1987). These political economy models
will be reviewed in the next section. Our main contribution is that we also look at the
implications of the balance of power in Congress on monetary policy. If Fed’s policy
is affected by political parties, then we would expect that a Republican Presidency
is more inflation averse as it is often argued (see the next section). We expect this to
hold, or even be stronger if both the President is a Republican and Republicans have
a majority in the Senate and the House of Representatives. Our hypothesis is that if
the political party of the President has control over Congress, then his or her political
influence on policymakers is high. We present the econometric model of the Taylor
rule in Sect. 3. In this section, we also discuss how we test our hypotheses related to
political pressure. The data are presented in Sect. 4. In Sect. 5, we present the results
and test whether the Fed is subject to political pressure. We complete the paper with
our main conclusion in Sect. 6.
2 Literature review
The time inconsistency, or dynamic inconsistency, problem is the main theoretical
driver of central bank independence. Time inconsistency occurs when a present plan
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is optimal for a future period but is actually suboptimal when the future period starts.
The most prominent models of the dynamic inconsistency approach, which are based
on game theory, are from Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983).
Their conclusion is that the dynamic inconsistency problem leads to a bias towards
higher inflation. As a result, Rogoff (1985) concludes that the central bank’s objective
function should reflect stronger inflation aversion than the objective function of the
society. In other words, society is better off by appointing a conservative central
banker who has an objective function that deviates from the social welfare function.
This makes central bank independence theoretically a preferred option (Taylor 2013).
We refer to Hayo and Hefeker (2002) for a critical review of the literature.
In this paper, we focus on political pressure on monetary and fiscal authorities.
Barro andGordon (1983) argue that whenmonetary rules are in place, every period the
policymaker is tempted to cheat on themonetary rules in order to benefit from inflation
shocks. A politician wants to engage in monetary policy and fiscal policy in order to
satisfy his own or his constituents’ preferences instead of choosing the optimal solution
for society as a whole. One of the possible arguments for choosing a suboptimal
solution is mentioned by Nordhaus (1975), who argues that politicians only care about
staying in the office. Kiewiet and Rivers (1984) find a relationship between the actual
economic performance and upcoming elections. The authors claim that voters aremore
likely to support the incumbent party when the economic situation is more favourable.
Consequently, politicians might try to influence the behaviour of the central bank. The
main assumption of Nordhaus’ (1975) model is that voters are not forward looking
and do not have any memory and therefore can be systematically fooled. Nordhaus’
(1975) model led to the creation of a political business cycle, where the incumbent
reduces unemployment before the elections, by stimulating the economy, andwill fight
inflation right after the elections by causing a recession. Although the outcomes of this
model became quite famous, the main critique is based on the assumption that voters
are not rational. However, evenwith rational voters Cukierman andMeltzer (1986) and
Rogoff and Sibert (1988) arrived at similar conclusions. In Rogoff and Sibert (1988),
the incomplete information of voters on the competence of policy makers causes the
cycle, while in Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) policymakers and voters have different
information about shocks. However, in many econometric studies on political business
cycles, such as Alesina et al. (1997) and Faust and Irons (1999), there is little support
for increasing economic activity prior to elections in the USA (see Drazen 2001 for a
review).
There is also a different view on why politicians would like to deviate from the
optimal solution. Hibbs (1987) argues that there are ideological differences between
parties, which lead to partisan politics creating macroeconomic cycles. For the USA,
his main assumption was that Democratic voters are poor and labourers, while the
Republican voters are rich and capitalists. In addition, he claims that expansionary
fiscal and monetary policy will lead to income redistribution from the rich to the poor.
Therefore, Hibbs concludes that the Democrats would be more tolerant to higher
inflation rates, while the Republicans would be more inflation averse. Alesina (1987)
models the partisan approach of Hibbs (1987) in a rational world, where elections
create uncertainty because the rational economic agents do not know which party will
win. As a result, this model predicts only differences at the beginning of the term in
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office of the new party. In the case of the USA, it predicts that if the Republicans win
the election, there will be low money growth and a recession while economic growth
and highmoney growthwill be observedwhen theDemocratswin the election. Alesina
and Sachs (1988) empirically confirm the findings of Alesina (1987).
Although the election driven monetary cycles give mixed results, there is more
positive empirical evidence for the partisan theory. Chappell et al. (1993) find that
the Presidents exerted their partisan’s influences in the Presidential appointments with
the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). Democrats’ appointees of the FOMC
are less strict when it comes to monetary policy compared to Republicans. Moreover,
Chappell and Keech (1986) find that money growth is systematically higher under
Democratic Presidents, which implies that Democrats seem to care less about inflation.
Furthermore, Caporale and Grier (1998) state that with Republican Presidents there is
significantly tighter monetary policy. In accordance with Caporale and Grier (1998),
Corder (2006) claims that with a backward-looking Taylor rule the Fed is more an
inflation fighter with Republicans in theWhite House. Based on the empirical studies,
it seems that the President has partisan influence on Fed decision-making. In this
paper, we take a novel approach since we do not only consider the political affiliation
of the President but also consider the balance of power in Congress which we argue
increases the influence of the President on policy makers.
3 Economic model
3.1 The expectations-augmented Taylor rule
To test the political monetary cycle theory and the partisan theory, we use a modified
Taylor rule model for Fed’s behaviour. The rationale behind the standard rule is that
when the inflation exceeds its target or when the output gap is positive, the nominal
interest rate has to be increased in order to reduce inflationary pressure. If the opposite
occurs, the rule recommends a lower nominal short-term interest rate in order to
stimulate consumption and investment.
Although Taylor (1993) shows that the rule describes the federal funds rate quite
accurate in the period 1987–1992, there are some arguments why the original rule
might not accurately describe the behaviour of a central bank. First of all, the twomain
objectives of the Fed, referred to as the FOMC’s dual mandate, are full employment
and price stability. Therefore, the output gap might be less relevant for the Fed than the
unemployment gap (see also Orphanides 2002; Mehra and Sawhney 2010). However,
there is no consensus about what the output measure should be (see Check 2015).
Secondly, Svensson (2003) states that even if the central bank’s objective is to stabilize
inflation and output a simple Taylor rule will be suboptimal. The reason is that the
impact of interest rate changes on inflation and output (or unemployment) comes with
a lag. Therefore, Svensson (2003) argues that the value of the instrument has to be set
consistentlywith the inflation target and output forecasts allowing the use of judgement
andwhat he calls extra-model information. In otherwords, the central bank’s behaviour
should be forward looking. Indeed, forecasts have always played an important role in
monetary policy decisions as Greenspan explains in his semiannual Testimony before
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theCommittee onBankingandFinancial Services, for theUSHouseofRepresentatives
(July 22, 1999). Besides this theoretical argument, there is also a practical argument,
namely that actual inflation and output are not known when the Fed sets its federal
funds rate target, only estimates are available. As a result, the rule should be based
on expected values instead of the realized values. Moreover, the series for actual
inflation, output, andunemployment are frequently adjusted as better estimates become
available. Using expected values based on surveys implies that we use sequential
information sets that are actually available as history unfolds (real-time data, see also
Mehra and Minton 2007; Mehra and Sawhney 2010). Orphanides (2001) concludes
that “…analysis of monetary policy rules based on data other than what is available to
policy makers in real time may be difficult to interpret…” [Orphanides 2001 p 984].
Finally, a well-observed behaviour of the Fed is commonly known as interest rate
smoothing. Interest rate smoothing reduces the variability of interest rate changes.
Following Sack and Wieland (2000), the main reasons for interest rate smoothing
are to avoid measurement errors in real-time data of key macroeconomic variables,
reduce uncertainty about outcomes of relevant structural parameters, and facilitate the
forward looking expectations of agents in the market. Woodford (1999) claims that
interest rate smoothing is a condition for optimal monetary policy. Although interest
rate smoothing is widely accepted, the standard Taylor rule does not allow for this.
Partial adjustment models that are often applied to model interest rate smoothing have
the drawback of serially correlated errors that bias the least squares standard errors. To
avoid this,wemodel interest rate smoothing in our expectations-augmentedTaylor rule
by applying Generalized Least Squares with first-order autocorrelation coefficient ρ:
it = ρit−1 + c0 (1 − ρ) + α
[(
Etπt+1 − π∗
) − ρ (Et−1πt − π∗
)]
+β [(Etut+1 − Etu∗t+1
) − ρ (Et−1ut − Et−1u∗t
)] + εt (1)
Here, it represents the nominal short-term interest rate, πt is the inflation rate,π∗ is the
(fixed) target level of the inflation rate, ut is the unemployment rate, u∗t is the natural
unemployment rate. Et denotes expectations available at time t , and εt is a randomerror
term. The inflation target of the Fed will be assumed to be 2% over the entire period.
This assumption is in accordance with Taylor (1993). We add dummy variables and
interaction terms of these dummy variables with the inflation term and the unemploy-
ment gap to test the political pressure theories of Hibbs (1987) and Nordhaus (1975).
The expectations with regard to the inflation rate and the unemployment rate are
available to the Fed before the Fed takes a decision on the interest rate. We assume that
the interest rate the Fed sets at time t is not affecting expectations about future rates
of inflation and unemployment. Despite the fact that the Fed recently offers guidance
for large, complex bank holding companies we do not think reverse causation is an
issue in the sample period we use.
3.2 Political pressure
We test the political monetary cycle theory and the partisan theory by adding dummy
variables and interaction terms that reflect these theories (this will be discussed below):
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)] + εt . (2)
If the dummy Dt takes the value 0, Eq. (2) reduces to Eq. (1), and α = α0 and
β = β0. The coefficients α1 and β1 measure the impact of the dummy variables on the
dependent variable: if the dummy Dt takes the value 1, the effect of expected deviation
of the inflation rate from its fixed target and the expected unemployment gap on the
federal funds rate is α = α0 + α1 and β = β0 + β1, respectively. We use different
dummy variables to test the different theories.
As already mentioned before, the political monetary cycle is based on the concept
of an economic boost before the election and a recession after the election with no
difference with respect to the partisan affiliation of the incumbent. In order to test
this theory, we construct two election (0, 1) dummies: a p-months before-election
dummy (Bp) and a p-months after-election dummy (Ap). The length of the before-
election and after-election periods p is three to nine months. In the next section, we
discuss how we construct the dummy variables in detail. Following the theory, an
economic boost before the election would let the Fed react less to inflation and more
to the unemployment gap. On the other hand, after the elections the Fed should be less
responsive to the unemployment gap and be more inflation averse.
To test the partisan theory, we construct a partisan-dummy P with the value of
1 when a Democrat President is in the office while it will be 0 when a Republican
President is in charge. Also we construct dummies for democratic control in the US
Senate (S), democratic control in the House of Representatives (H), democratic con-
trol in Congress (C), and democratic control in Congress together with a democratic
President in office (D × C). The partisan theory describes that Republicans are more
inflation avers while the Democrats care more about unemployment. Our tests will
reveal whether there is significant pressure of the incumbent on the Fed to change their
behaviour towards the federal funds rate. The partisan theory indicates that Republi-
cans are more inflation avers while the Democrats care more about unemployment.
However,when theFed is completely independent from theWhiteHouse, both theories
should be rejected.
4 Data
We are analysing political pressure for the period August 1987 until and including
January 2006. In this period, the Fed was led by Alan Greenspan. When we discuss
the results in the next section, we also extend the sample period to include the period
in which Volcker was Chairman of the Fed. Table 4 in Appendix 1 gives a description
of the time series used in this paper. The effective federal funds rate is from the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. These are annualized monthly averages
based on daily figures. The survey of the University of Michigan has been used to
123









1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Median expected 12 month ahead inflation rate
Actual annual inflation (CPI; US Bureau of Labor Statistics)







1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Median 4-quarter ahead forecast of unemployment
Unemployment (US Bureau of Labor Statistics)
Fig. 2 The median expected 4-quarter ahead forecast of unemployment and the actual unemployment rate
obtain the expected yearly inflation rate for every month. The expected 12-month
ahead inflation rate is less volatile than the actual annual inflation rate as is shown in
Fig. 1.
The quarterly expected unemployment rate is from a survey of professional fore-
casters of the Federal Bank of Philadelphia. Figure 2 reveals that the expected 4-quarter
ahead forecast of unemployment underestimates the peaks and troughs in the actual
unemployment rate. These peaks and troughs in the actual unemployment rate for the
USA correspond closely to the peaks (July 1990 andMarch 2001) and troughs (March
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Table 1 The balance of power between Congress and the Presidency in the period 1987–2007. Source:
http://uspolitics.about.com/od/usgovernment/l/bl_party_division_2.htm
Year Congress President Senate (100) House (435)
Jan 2005–Dec 2006 109th R R-55 R-232
Jan 2003–Dec 2004 108th R R-51 R-229
Jan 2001–Dec 2002 107th R Da R-221
Jan 1999–Dec 2000 106th D R-55 R-223
Jan 1997–Dec 1998 105th D R-55 R-228
Jan 1995–Dec 1996 104th D R-52 R-230
Jan 1993–Dec 1994 103rd D D-57 D-258
Jan 1991–Dec 1992 102nd R D-56 D-267
Jan 1989–Dec 1990 101st R D-55 D-260
Jan 1987–Dec 1988 100th R D-55 D-258
a There were 50 Democrats (D) and 50 Republicans (R) until 24 May 2001, when Sen. James Jeffords
(R-VT) switched to Independent status, effective 6 June 2001; he announced that he would caucus with the
Democrats, giving the Democrats a one-seat advantage
1991 and November 2001) in the US business cycle as dated by the National Bureau
of Economic Research.
Insteadof assuming a constant natural unemployment rate of for instance6%,weuse
the Hodrick–Prescott filter because the Fedmight target a different rate under different
economic circumstances. The quarterly expected unemployment rate is decomposed
in a monthly trend component, which we interpret as the expected natural rate of
unemployment, and a cyclical component using a state-space approach of theHodrick–
Prescott filter using a wider sample (July 1954 until and including June 2013) to
avoid the end-point bias. We denote by the expected unemployment gap the difference
between the median 4-quarter ahead forecast and the smoothed monthly trend com-
ponent from the Hodrick–Prescott filter. Finally, the target level of the inflation is set
at 2% annually, and the expected inflation gap is defined as the median expected price
change in the next 12 months minus 2.
In our analysis, we focus on the Greenspan era: August 1987 until January 2006.
In this period, there were five elections with 8 years of Democrats (Clinton admin-
istrations, February 1993–January 2001) and 10.5 years of Republicans in the office
(Reagan, February 1981–January 1989; G.H.W. Bush, February 1989–January 1993;
and G.W. Bush, February 2001–January 2009). Table 1 shows the balance of power
between Congress and the President. The balance of power in Congress in this period
shifted from Democrats to Republicans at the end of 1994 with a short interruption
in the Senate in the period June 2001–December 2002. Only during the 103rd, the
108th, and the 109th Congress did the incumbent President have full support from both
the Senate and the House of Representatives. In the periods January 1987–December
1992 and January 1995–December 2000, the President faced aCongress from the other
party. In the periods January 1987–December 1992, January 1995–December 2000,
and June 2001–December 2002, a situation that may be called a “hung” Congress or
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Government—where the Senate, the House of Representatives, or Presidency are not
dominated by a single party—occurs.
To test the political pressure hypotheses, we construct dummy variables. The
dummy variable P has a value of 1 in the months in which the Democrats are in
office and zeroes for Republicans. Furthermore, we constructed two (0, 1) election
dummy variables: Bp and Ap have ones p months before, respectively, after the elec-
tions, and 0 elsewhere. The length p for the lags and leads is 3, 6, and 9 months.
5 Results and discussion
The base model presented in Eq. (2) is estimated using maximum likelihood. We set
the coefficients at initial values, although the results are not sensitive to the choice of
initial values. The first-order autocorrelation coefficient is initially chosen close to the
first-order autocorrelation coefficient of the federal funds rate (0.9). The initial value
for the nominal target interest rate of 4% is based on a real interest rate of 2 and 2%
inflation. The estimation results of the basemodel for the period August 1987–January
2006 are shown in the first column of Table 2. In Appendix 2, we show the results
including the period in which Volcker was Chairman of the Fed under Presidents
Carter and Reagan.
Table 2 shows that in the base model for the period August 1987–January 2006 the
weights in the Taylor rule are as expected. The coefficient α that measures the reaction
of the Fed to deviations of expected inflation from its target value is 0.25 (p value
= 0.004) which is significantly lower than 0.5 (p value = 0.004) that Taylor (1993)
proposes. The coefficient β that measures the reaction of the Fed to deviations in the
expected unemployment gap is −0.57 (p value = 0.049). Note that in the Volcker–
Greenspan period the coefficient for the expected inflation gap is not significantly
different from zero at the usual levels of significance (see Table 5 in Appendix 2).
In this section, we test the existence of the political monetary cycle and partisan
affiliation for the period in which Greenspan served as Chairman of the Fed of the
USA from August 1987 to January 2006 using Eq. (2). We add election dummies
(before and after elections dummies with different leads and lags) to test for election
cycles. Table 2 shows that including election dummies with leads and lags of 3, 6, or
9 months does not affect these results of the base model since none of the coefficients
for the dummy variables and the interaction terms differ from zero at the usual levels
of significance. We conclude that there is no support for election driven cycles in the
Taylor rule in the period August 1987 to January 2006. If we apply the model to the
period from August 1979 to January 2006, we find some evidence for election driven
cycles (see Table 5 in Appendix 2). Six months before elections the Fed attaches a
higher weight to reducing unemployment, while six months after elections emphasis
is on reducing inflation.
To find evidence for a partisan effect, we add dummies for political affiliation of
the incumbent President and the power balance in Congress as in Eq. (2). Table 3 only
shows the coefficients for the deviation of expected inflation to the target inflation
rate (α) and the coefficient for the expected unemployment gap (β). We can conclude
that in our expectations-augmented Taylor rule there are deviations from rules-based
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Table 2 Estimates of the expectations-augmented Taylor rule (August 1987–January 2006) and variations
that include election dummies with different leads and lags (standard errors between brackets)
Base p = 3 months p = 6 months p = 9 months
Intercept 3.475 2.604 1.350 1.601
(2.593) (2.708) (4.477) (4.751)
Etπt+1 − π∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗ 0.208∗∗
(0.087) (0.079) (0.097) (0.104)
Et ut+1 − Et u∗t+1 −0.572∗∗ −0.539∗ −0.520∗ −0.518
(0.291) (0.288) (0.303) (0.324)
AR (1) 0.971∗∗∗ 0.968∗∗∗ 0.970∗∗∗ 0.973∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.031) (0.035) (0.033)
Before Bp 5.898 9.698 6.443
(28.942) (13.480) (9.654)
Bp × (Etπt+1 − π∗) −1.033 0.305 0.036
(5.516) (0.583) (0.282)
Bp × (Et ut+1 − Et u∗t+1) 0.378 −0.810 0.224
(7.339) (2.398) (0.999)
After Ap −2.397 6.900 2.239
(18.756) (8.998) (5.710)
Ap × (Etπt+1 − π∗) −3.448 −0.051 0.375
(2.827) (0.338) (0.384)
Ap × (Et ut+1 − Et u∗t+1) −1.595 −0.882 −0.569
(2.238) (0.894) (0.674)
Observations 222 222 222 222
Log likelihood −47.660 −43.091 −44.464 −46.113
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ Significant at 10, 5, and 1%, respectively
monetary policy (see Friedman (2006)). More specifically, from Table 3 we conclude
that
(i) In the base model (Table 3, Row a), the Taylor rule was followed with the
weight on expected unemployment being twice as high as the weight in expected
inflation. This resembles the result of Corder (2006) for the Greenspan period.
Corder (2006) reports similarly sized coefficients, but he uses the output gap.
(ii) Under a Republican President (Table 3, Row b), the coefficients of the Taylor
rule are the same as in the base model. However, the coefficient of the expected
unemployment gap is not significant at 10%. Under a Democratic President, the
weights on both the expected inflation gap and the expected unemployment gap
are statistically not different from zero at the usual levels of significance. This
result favours the hypothesis that Republicans are more inflation avers.
(iii) In a Democratic controlled Congress (Table 3, Row c), which occurs in period
January 1987–December 1994, emphasis was predominantly on reducing infla-
tion, whereas in a non-Democratic controlled Congress emphasis shifted to
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Table 3 A summary of the findings of the weights in the expectations-augmented Taylor rule (August
1987–January 2006) including dummy variables that reflect the balance of power in Congress
α β
(a) Base model 0.253∗∗∗ −0.572∗∗
(b) P = 0 Republican Presidency 0.266∗∗∗ −0.507
P = 1 Democratic Presidency 0.090 −0.439
(c) D = 0 Non-Democratic controlled Congress −0.018 −1.188∗∗
D = 1 Democratic controlled Congress 0.488∗∗∗ −0.341
(d) R = 0 Non-Republican controlled Congress 0.410∗∗∗ −0.279
R = 1 Republican controlled Congress 0.021 −1.134∗∗
(e) P × D = 0 No Full Democratic control 0.259∗∗∗ −0.513∗
P × D = 1 Full Democratic control 0.013 −1.653
(f) (1 − P) × R = 0 No Full Republican control 0.395∗∗∗ −0.313
(1 − P) × R = 1 Full Republican control 0.039 −2.025∗∗
(g) H = 0 No “hung” Congress 0.038 −2.072∗∗∗
H = 1 “Hung” Congress 0.410∗∗∗ −0.180
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ Significant at 10, 5, and 1%, respectively
reducing unemployment. The latter is also observed in a Republican controlled
Congress (Table 3, Row d). These conflicting results from a partisan point of
view can be explained by differences in the economic situation.
(iv) When the Republicans faced a minority in either the Senate or the House of
Representatives (Table 3, Row d), emphasis was on reducing inflation as in the
Democratic controlled Congress (Table 3, Row c).
(v) In periods in which the Democrats had full control in Congress (Table 3, Row
e), the results are similar to those with a Democratic President in office: both
coefficients do not differ from zero at the usual levels of significance. In the short
period that Democrats were in full control, from January 1993 to January 1995,
expected inflation was fairly stable and unemployment was expected to fall.
(vi) Interestingly, and perhaps surprisingly, in the period from January 2001 until
December 2006 (with a short interruption in 2001) in which Republicans had
full control (defined as a situation where the President is of the same party as the
majority in Congress) the weight on the expected unemployment is high and sig-
nificantly negative (Table 3, Row f). In this period, unemployment was expected
to rise while inflation was low. This result indicates that it is the differences in
economic situations that matters for the design of monetary policy rather than
political affiliation (cf. Friedman 2006).
(vii) With a “hung” Congress (Table 3, Row g), where the President, the majority
in the Senate and in the House of Representative are not all from the same
party, preference is given to reducing inflation. If there is no hung Congress, the




Our main conclusion is that we find conflicting results if we compare periods with a
Democratic President and aRepublicanPresident, and periodswithRepublican control
of Congress and Democratic control of Congress. We conclude that these differences
are not explained by different political points of view. The main conclusion is that
monetary policy underGreenspan is discretionary and based on the actual and expected
economic conditions rather than being based on a fixed rule. The conclusions are less
ambiguous if we include the Volcker period in our analysis. For the extended period,
we observe that a Democratic Presidency or a Democratic Congress more closely
follows the prescription of the Taylor rule (see Table 6 in Appendix 2).
There are some limitations of our study. First of all, the inflation target of 2% of the
Fed may not be always representing the actual target. Secondly, there may be omitted
variables such as financial stress indicators, which are not taken in account in the
model explicitly.
6 Conclusion
In order to test political pressure on monetary policy, the Fed’s reaction function is
modelled for the period August 1987–January 2006 by an expectations-augmented
Taylor rule specification.
We deviate from the standard Taylor rule in three aspects. Firstly, motivated by the
Fed’s dual mandate (full employment and price stability) we replace the output gap
in the Taylor rule with the unemployment gap. Secondly, the Taylor rule is forward
looking since we use expected values for inflation and unemployment. Finally, we
allow for interest rate smoothing. This expectations-augmentedTaylor rule is estimated
for the period August 1987–January 2006, and we test two political macroeconomic
theories. The first is to test for evidence of an election driven monetary cycle in the
Taylor rule, and the second is whether partisan affiliation of the President andCongress
matters.
We found no evidence for an opportunistic election driven cycles because election
dummies with various leads and lags are statistically not significant. Also, we did
not find evidence of an effect of partisan affiliation. When a Republican President is
in office, emphasis was on reducing inflation as theory suggests, but in a Republican
controlled Congress focus was on reducing unemployment. The same result was found
if the President is Republican and Republicans face a majority in Congress. In these
periods, in the 2000s the economic situationwasmore turbulent. This seems to confirm
the conclusion by Friedman (2006) that the Fed under Greenspan departed from a
strict policy rule because of less favourable, economic conditions. Furthermore, we
show that the Fed has been less inflation avers and less unemployment avers when
a Democrat President is in office. On the other hand, we show that in a Democratic
controlled Congress (January 1987–December 1994) emphasis was predominantly on
reducing inflation. To explain these results, which are not consistent with partisan
theories, again we conclude that it is the economic situation that drives our results.
This observation is in linewithKahn’s (2005) statement that “…Greenspan’s approach
to monetary policy was described as discretionary, flexible, and based on a deep
understanding of economic data and business conditions…”
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Appendix 1: Data: definitions and sources
See Table 4.
Table 4 Series names, definitions, samples, and sources
Series
name
Description Sample, units and frequency Source
it Effective Federal Funds Rate 1954M7–2013M6 (Monthly;




Data (FRED); Board of
Governors of the Federal
Reserve System
Etπt+1 Median expected price
change next 12 months
1978M1–2013M5 (Monthly;


















(0,1)-dummy: 1’s p = 3, 6,




(0,1)-dummy: 1’s p = 3, 6,
9 months after elections; 0
elsewhere
1954M7–2013M3
P, D, R, H (0,1)-dummies: 1 for a
Democrat President (P), a
Democratic Congress (D),
a Republican Congress (R),
or a Hung Congress (H); 0
elsewhere
1954M7–2013M3
Appendix 2: Results for the period August 1979–January 2006
See Tables 5, 6.
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Table 5 Estimates of the expectations-augmented Taylor rule (August 1979–January 2006) and variations
that include election dummies with different leads and lags (standard errors between brackets)
Base p = 3 months p = 6 months p = 9 months
Intercept 5.674 5.266∗∗∗ 5.633∗∗∗ 5.221∗∗∗
(3.955) (2.034) (1.736) (1.902)
Etπt+1 − π∗ 0.319 0.253 0.435 0.432
(0.323) (0.345) (0.336) (0.507)
Et ut+1 − Et u∗t+1 −0.981∗∗ −0.490 −0.118 −0.440
(0.434) (0.637) (0.653) (1.188)
AR (1) 0.912∗∗∗ 0.858∗∗∗ 0.832∗∗∗ 0.774∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.036) (0.032) (0.063)
Before Bp −1.171 −1.581 −1.615
(9.185) (4.651) (3.803)
Bp × (Etπt+1 − π∗) 1.482 −0.213 0.880
(3.246) (0.868) (0.832)
Bp × (Et ut+1 − Et u∗t+1) −3.393 −5.082∗∗∗ −1.329
(4.109) (1.599) (1.391)
After Ap 1.132 −4.551 −1.033
(5.494) (3.446) (2.657)
Ap × (Etπt+1 − π∗) 5.499 3.206∗∗∗ 2.599∗∗∗
(3.545) (0.907) (0.894)
Ap × (Et ut+1 − Et u∗t+1) −1.825 −3.231 −0.481
(10.620) (3.442) (2.900)
Observations 318 318 318 318
Log likelihood −188.297 −175.138 −176.210 −184.141
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ Significant at 10, 5, and 1%, respectively
Table 6 A summary of the findings of the weights in the expectations-augmented Taylor rule (August
1979–January 2006) including dummy variables that reflect the balance of power in Congress
α β
(a) Base model 0.319 −0.981∗∗
(b) P = 0 Republican Presidency 0.152 −0.883
P = 1 Democratic Presidency 1.386∗∗∗ −0.355
(c) D = 0 Non-Democratic controlled Congress 0.049 −1.107
D = 1 Democratic controlled Congress 0.764∗∗ −1.033∗∗
(d) R = 0 Non-Republican controlled Congress 0.524∗ −0.965∗∗
R = 1 Republican controlled Congress 0.017 −1.081
(e) P × D = 0 No Full Democratic control 0.149 −0.877
P × D = 1 Full Democratic control 1.102∗∗ −0.756
(f) (1 − P) × R = 0 No Full Republican control 0.546∗ −0.885∗∗
(1 − P) × R = 1 Full Republican control 0.036 −1.821
(g) H = 0 No “hung” Congress 0.110 −1.470∗∗∗
H = 1 “Hung” Congress 0.356 −0.548
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ Significant at 10, 5, and 1%, respectively
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